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David J. Doorey*

The Stubborn Persistence of the Lawyer
Exemption in Canadian Collective
Bargaining Legislation

In 1948, the Canadian government introduced transformative collective bargaining
legislation that would serve as a template for provincial labour law in the postwar
period. However, some employees were excluded entirely from this legislation,
including employees in five professions, law among them. By the 1970s, the federal
government and most provinces had repealed the professional exclusion from the
primary collective bargaining legislation. However, four jurisdictions—Ontario,
Alberta, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island (Exclusionary Provinces)—have
stubbornly preserved the exclusion. This essay traces the history and justifications
proffered for the lawyer exclusion from Canadian collective bargaining legislation
from the 1940s to present day. It examines lawyer collective bargaining in practice
and concludes with an assessment of the lawyer exclusion considering recent
decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada expanding the scope of section 2(d)
freedom of association under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

En 1948, le gouvernement canadien a introduit une loi transformatrice sur la
négociation collective qui allait servir de modèle au droit du travail provincial durant la
période d’après-guerre. Cependant, certains employés étaient entièrement exclus
de cette législation, notamment les employés de cinq professions, dont les avocats.
Dans les années 1970, le gouvernement fédéral et la plupart des provinces ont
abrogé l’exclusion des professionnels prévue dans la loi initiale sur la négociation
collective. Cependant, quatre juridictions—l’Ontario, l’Alberta, la Nouvelle-Écosse
et l’Île-du-Prince-Édouard—ont obstinément conservé l’exclusion. Dans le présent
article, nous retraçons l’historique et les justifications avancées pour l’exclusion
des avocats de la législation canadienne sur la négociation collective, des années
1940 à aujourd’hui. Nous examinons la négociation collective des avocats dans
la pratique et concluons par une évaluation de l’exclusion des avocats en tenant
compte des décisions récentes de la Cour suprême du Canada qui élargissent la
portée de la liberté d’association prévue à l’alinéa 2d) de la Charte canadienne
des droits et libertés.

*
Ph.D, Associate Professor of Labour and Employment Law, York University, Toronto. My thanks
to Liam Thompson for excellent research assistance and Erin Sobat and two anonymous reviewers for
helpful suggestions.
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Introduction
In 1948, the federal government introduced a novel provision into
its primary post War collective bargaining legislation, the Industrial
Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (IRDIA).1 Practicing lawyers
were excluded, along with members of the medical, dental, architectural,
and engineering professions. Several opposition members of Parliament
objected to the exclusion on principle, arguing that the selection of the
five professions was random and that in any event there was no rationale
for treating employed professionals differently than other employees
concerning the right to collective bargaining. However, the federal Minister
of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell, persisted with the exclusion not because
he believed that for some valid policy reason the professionals ought not
1.

Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, Missing Vol Abbrev 1948, c 54, s 2(1)(i) [IRDIA].
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to be permitted to unionize and engage in collective bargaining. Rather,
Mitchell excluded the professions for the simple reason that the national
organizations representing those professions, including the Canadian Bar
Association (CBA), asked to be excluded.
Mitchell assumed that the CBA spoke for the “majority” of the legal
profession and acknowledged that it “may be proved to these organizations
and their membership in the light of experience that their judgement was
unsound,” and at that time the exclusion could be revisited.2 This was not
a difficult political calculus. In the 1940s, almost every lawyer was selfemployed and therefore already exempt from employment-related statutes,
and the few who were employees were mostly in-house counsel who likely
would have been excluded from the legislation anyways as managerial
or “confidential” employees.3 Therefore, even if employed lawyers were
not expressly excluded it was unlikely any would have unionized. Nor
was there any organization pushing back against the lawyer exclusion.
The labour movement was focused on larger issues with the proposed
legislation and with getting new labour legislation enacted as quickly
as possible.4 Therefore, deferring to the professional associations was a
politically expedient choice for the federal government in 1948.
What happened next reflects a particular historical moment in time
in Canadian labour law. With the uncertainty of a postwar economy
still looming and the impending reversion of jurisdiction over labour
relations back to the provinces, there was widespread consensus across
the country that, in the pursuit of labour relations stability, the federal
government should develop a model of collective bargaining that could
be adopted as a provincial template. The IRDIA served this purpose
and in the years surrounding its enactment, all the provinces introduced
collective bargaining legislation modelled after the IRDIA. While there
was some debate about some parts of the legislation in some provinces,
the professional exclusion was adopted wholesale in all the provinces
(except Saskatchewan) without comment or discussion. In this manner,
the professional exclusion, unusual by international standards, became a
peculiar feature of the Canadian collective bargaining law landscape with

2.
House of Commons, Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 20-4, No 6 (17 June
1948) at 5368.
3.
The IRDIA included the typical clause still found today in Canadian collective bargaining
legislation which excludes employees from coverage who “exercise managerial functions” or are “employed in
a confidential capacity in matters relating to labour relations”: IRDIA, supra note 1, s 2(1)(i).
4.
See discussion below, Judy Fudge & Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of
Workers’ Collective Action in Canada, 1900–1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) at 294295.
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virtually no debate.5 No Canadian government attempted to justify the
exclusion on policy grounds. Rather, the federal government’s decision
to heed the request from a few professional organizations to be excluded
from postwar federal labour legislation led indirectly to lawyers being
excluded from collective bargaining legislation across the country.
There was not much fuss about the professional exclusion initially.
However, as professional practice evolved in subsequent decades and
more professionals from the excluded occupations became “employees,”
the exclusion caught the eye of policymakers, academics, and the labour
movement. At an academic symposium held at the University of Toronto
in 1965, there was general agreement that there was no policy rationale for
excluding professionals from collective bargaining legislation.6 Professor
Mark MacGuigan of the University of Toronto Law School summed up
the general mood of the participants when he observed that a professional
employee “in relation to his employer is nothing other than another
employee, and for whom the economic aspect is therefore vital” and that
collective bargaining “will make professional employees more rather than
less fully professional, for it will restore to them in some measure the
independence and self-control of which they have been deprived by their
status as employees.”7
The influential 1968 federal task force on labour relations (the “Woods
Task Force”) dealt with the issue of collective bargaining by professionals
at length and concluded that there was no rational policy justification for it.8
By 1972, the federal government had come around to this way of thinking.
That year, it ratified ILO Convention 87, which requires governments
to protect the right to collective bargaining of all employees “without
distinction whatsoever,” and it removed the professional exclusion from
the Canada Labour Code. Most provinces then fell into line and followed
5.
Practicing lawyers are not singled out for special treatment in collective bargaining legislation in
the United States, the UK or Australia: See Laura Midwood & Amy Vitacco, “The Right of Attorneys
to Unionize, Collectively Bargain, and Strike: Legal and Ethical Considerations” (2000) 18:1 Hofstra
Lab & Empl LJ 299.
6.
See John HG Crispo, ed, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee: Conference
Proceedings: December 15-17, 1965 (Toronto: Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto,
1966).
7.
Mark MacGuigan, “Arguments For and Against Collective Bargaining by Professionals” in
John HG Crispo, ed, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee: Conference Proceedings:
December 15-17, 1965 (Toronto: Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto, 1966) 26 at
31, 33.
8.
Canada, Privy Council Office, Canadian Industrial Relations: Report of the Federal Task Force
on Labour Relations (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968) [Woods Task Force]; Shirley
B Goldenberg, Professional Workers and Collective Bargaining (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour
Relations, 1968).
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the federal government’s lead in repealing the professional exclusion from
their primary collective bargaining legislation. It took longer for some
of these provinces and the federal government to extend full statutory
collective bargaining rights to lawyers employed by the crown, but most
eventually did so.9 Only four Canadian jurisdictions have stubbornly
persisted with the professional exclusion: Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia,
and Prince Edward Island (the “Exclusionary Provinces”).
The fact that the lawyer exclusion remains in place in the Exclusionary
Provinces is surprising considering that thousands of lawyers from coast
to coast, including many in the Exclusionary Provinces, are unionized
and have been participating in collective bargaining for decades. This
experience should have ended any doubt that collective bargaining is
suitable for employed lawyers. More remarkable still is the persistence of
the exclusion after the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) recent “shift to
a purposive and generous approach to labour relations” in the guarantee
of freedom of association under section 2(d) of the Charter.”10 The 2015
decision in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (AttorneyGeneral) especially casts doubt on the constitutionality of occupational
exclusions from collective bargaining legislation. Indeed, in recommending
the removal of the professional exclusion found in the Ontario Labour
Relations Act in their final Changing Workplaces Review (CWR) report
in 2017, the expert special advisors concluded that the SCC’s decision in
MPAO “mandated” the removal of the exclusion.11 Still, Ontario and the
other Exclusionary Provinces persist with the exclusion.
This article traces the history of the professional exclusion from
collective bargaining legislation in Canada from 1947 to the present day,
with a special emphasis on the exclusion of employed, practicing lawyers.
The story takes us from a time when almost every lawyer was a selfemployed entrepreneur to today when thousands of lawyers are employed
in all sorts of public- and private-sector jobs across the country. A notable
aspect in the story of the persistent exclusion of lawyers in a handful of
provinces is the almost complete absence of any justification provided
by any government official in the nearly 75 years since the exclusion
was first introduced. Even when obligated to justify the exclusion to
9.
In Newfoundland and Labrador and British Columbia, lawyers are not excluded from the main
collective bargaining legislation, but crown attorneys and civil lawyers employed by the government
are excluded from the public sector collective bargaining legislation.
10. Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1 at 125
[MPAO].
11. The Changing Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights: Final Report (Ontario:
Ministry of Labour, 2017) c 10.7, recommendations 139-142 at 309-310, online (pdf): <files.ontario.
ca/books/mol_changing_workplace_report_eng_2_0.pdf> [https://perma.cc/V5E3-FCWL].
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the International Labour Organization in 1997, the best the Ontario
government could do is argue that the “adversarial nature” of unionization
and collective bargaining renders it incompatible and unsuitable with the
professional workplace.12 Thus, the argument was that the exclusion is
necessary to stop lawyers from unionizing and seeking access to collective
bargaining. This is a purpose that is almost certainly inconsistent with the
broad and generous approach to section 2(d) of the Charter developed by
the SCC in recent years.
The essay will proceed as follows. Part I traces the origins of the
professional exclusion in the 1948 IRDIA and the subsequent import
of the exclusion into provincial collective bargaining legislation. Part
II examines the movement beginning in the 1960s to expand collective
bargaining rights to professionals culminating in 1972 with the removal of
the professional exclusion from the Canada Labour Code and the decision
by most provinces afterwards to do the same. Part III discusses the practice
and experience of lawyer collective bargaining in the Canadian jurisdictions
that removed the professional exclusion (the “Inclusionary Provinces”). In
Part IV, we examine the treatment of lawyers and their efforts to engage in
collective bargaining in the four Exclusionary Provinces: Alberta, Ontario,
Nova Scotia, and PEI. Part V describes the treatment of the lawyer and
professional exclusion in academic and policy literature from the 1960s
forward. Finally, Part VI examines the professional exclusion through
the lens of the generous and expansive interpretation of Charter section
2(d) freedom of association and considers whether the exemption is likely
to survive a Charter challenge. Ultimately, the essay concludes that the
professional exclusion is unlikely to survive a section 2(d) challenge, which
raises the important policy question of why the professional exclusion is
not just repealed in the few jurisdictions where it persists.
I.

The source of the lawyer exemption: the Federal Industrial Relations
Disputes Investigation Act, 1948
Prior to 1948, collective bargaining legislation in Canada, from the 1907
Industrial Disputes Investigation Act to the 1944 Wartime Labour Relations
Regulation, Order in Council PC 1003 (“PC 1003”) and provincial
variations did not expressly exclude practicing lawyers. In practice though,
very few lawyers would have been covered by such legislation anyways,
because hardly any lawyers were “employees.” In 1941, 90.5 per cent of
lawyers were self-employed in private practice. By 1951, 83 per cent of
12. “CFA Report No 308” (1997) at para 172, online: International Labour Organization <www.
ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50002:0::NO::P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_
ID:2904114> [perma.cc/32JL-FB9N].
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practicing lawyers were self-employed.13 The vast majority of Canadian
lawyers worked as self-employed practitioners in law firms with one or
two lawyers.14 In the late 1940s, only about five per cent of practicing
lawyers were employed in private industry, usually in the capacity as inhouse general counsel and who therefore would likely have been excluded
from collective bargaining legislation under the managerial or confidential
employee exclusions. Only about five to six per cent of practicing lawyers
were employed in public administration by the late 1940s.15 Prior to
the 1970s, lawyers employed by community organizations, unions, or
advocacy organizations “were almost nonexistent.”16
Therefore, since the legal profession was comprised almost entirely
of self-employed practitioners, legislation targeting collective bargaining
between employees and employers attracted little interest within the legal
community beyond a handful of practitioners who worked in the burgeoning
field of labour law representing unions or employers. The fact that
practicing lawyers were not expressly excluded from collective bargaining
legislation was neither here nor there. Almost all lawyers were ineligible
to join trade unions anyways, and those lawyers who were “employees”
and therefore technically covered by the legislation demonstrated little
interest in joining unions. For junior lawyers, employment by small law
firms was merely a temporary stopover on the path to partnership or the
establishment of a private practice. Trade unions were for the working
class, not lawyers.
In the summer of 1947, the CBA became interested in Bill C-338,
An Act to Provide for the Investigation, Conciliation, and Settlement of
Industrial Disputes. Bill C-338 would replace both the IRDIA and PC
1003 while incorporating many of the features of the collective bargaining
model introduced by PC 1003, including the principles of majoritarianism
and exclusivity that had been borrowed with some revisions from the
American National Labor Relations Act (the “Wagner model”). The
federal government anticipated that Bill 338, once enacted, would serve as
a template for provincial collective bargaining legislation and create a de
facto national labour code in the postwar period, despite labour relations

13. David Stager & Harry Williams Arthurs, Lawyers in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1990) at 179.
14. Ibid at 176-177: “Prior to the 1950s, law firms were characterized by one or two lawyers working
in a modest office, with the assistance of a typist-bookkeeper and occasionally a law clerk or student.
Large firms of 25-30 lawyers were non-existent….”
15. Ibid at 271.
16. HW Arthurs, R Weisman & F Zemans, “The Canadian Legal Profession” (1986) 11 American
Bar Foundation Research J 447 at 460.
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falling primarily under provincial jurisdiction.17 This desire for consistency
in federal and provincial labour law was widely shared by the provinces
coming out of World War II.
The CBA was concerned with a section of Bill 338 which precluded
lawyers from representing clients in conciliation proceedings under the
proposed legislation.18 In a written submission dated 23 April 1948, the
Chairman of the CBA Committee on Industrial Relations and Labour Law,
an ad hoc committee hastily formed in 1948 to make representations on
the Bill, requested that the section be removed.19 Although not referenced
in the April 23rd letter or in any other document I have been able to locate,
it is clear from the debates found in the Hansard reports, reviewed below,
that the CBA also requested that lawyers be exempted entirely from the
new federal labour legislation.20 This request for exclusion was accepted
by the government as demonstrated by the inclusion in Bill 338 of a novel
professional exclusion provision.
Bill 338 defined “employee” as excluding, “a member of the medical,
dental, architectural, or legal profession qualified to practice under the
laws of a province and employed in that capacity.”21 Bill 338 lapsed, but
its substantive terms were re-introduced in the following session as Bill
C-195, An Act to Provide for the Investigation, Conciliation and Settlement
of Industrial Disputes. Bill C-195 introduced legislation that would be
known as the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, 1948
(IRDIA). Bill 195 added “engineers” to the list of excluded professions that
had originally appeared in Bill 338. This change was made at the request
of the National Association of Professional Engineers and the Engineering
Institute of Canada, which had lobbied the government to treat engineers
in the same manner as the other four listed professions.22

17. See House of Commons, Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 20-3, No 5 (17
June 1947) at 4230-4231 (Hon Humphrey Mitchell).
18. “The Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association” (1944) 22:7 Can Bar
Rev 577 at 578.
19. Letter from Cecil Robinson, Chairman of the Dominion Section of the CBA Committee on
Industrial Relations and Labour Law to Colin Gibson, Secretary of State, Government of Canada (23
April 1948) (the section in question was ultimately removed from the Bill at the CBA’s request).
20. I reviewed the debates and documents from the House of Commons and Committee hearings
relating to Bill 338 and Bill 195, as well as minutes of all CBA meetings during this period. I was
unable to locate any document prepared by the CBA that demands the exclusion of lawyers from either
Bill. However, as explained below, the Minister of Labour states on multiple occasions in the Hansard
that the CBA has requested that lawyers be excluded from the Bill.
21. Bill 338, An Act to Provide for the Investigation, Conciliation and Settlement of Industrial
Disputes, 3rd Sess, 20th Parl, 1947.
22. See House of Commons, Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 20-4, No 4 (22
April 1948) at 3208.
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If not for this late addition of “engineers” to the list, the professional
exclusion likely would have passed with little debate or attention. The
associations representing the four other professions had requested an
expressed exclusion and the labour movement was indifferent to the
exclusion since unions were not interested in organizing these professions.
The Canadian Congress of Labour submitted a draft National Labour
Code to the Standing Committee on Industrial Relations (IR Committee)
for consideration in February 1948 that included the same definition
of “employee” found in Bill 195 that excluded the listed professions.23
Meanwhile, the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada argued for the
government, “to expedite the passage of Bill 195 as quickly as possible.”24
Therefore, in 1948, when the statutory exclusion of practicing lawyers
was first proposed and debated, the two umbrella labour movement
organizations supported the exclusion.
However, the addition of engineers caught the attention of several
members of the IR Committee in the Bill 195 deliberations. Under PC
1003, some 1100 engineers in Ontario and Quebec had joined the Employee
Professional Engineers and Assistants Union (EPEAU). The EPEAU had
been certified and had already bargained several collective agreements
with more still in negotiations. The EPEAU argued in submissions to the
IR Committee that engineers should be covered by the legislation as they
had been under PC 1003 and that it would be inappropriate and unjust
for collective bargaining rights to be stripped from employees who had
already exercised their rights to unionize and were covered by collective
agreements. Some of the politicians sitting on the IR Committee agreed,
and they went further and questioned the purpose and legitimacy of
professional exclusion clause as a whole.
The central argument from the members of Parliament who objected
to the professional exclusion was that insofar as professionals (including
lawyers) were “employed” they stood in the same position as other
employees and, therefore, they ought to have the same legal protections
to form and join unions and engage in collective bargaining if they so
choose. This sentiment is captured in the following selection of speeches
from members of the Standing Committee on Industrial Relations:
MP MacInnis: “If you delete this [professional exclusion clause]
altogether you are not compelling doctors, lawyers, or engineers, to
come under this Act, but you are doing the same thing with them as you
23. See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons
Debates, 20-4, No 1 (27 April 1948) at 41.
24. See ibid at 13.
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are doing with the plumbers, conductors, street railway men, miners and
others. You are leaving them free to make use of this Act or not make use
of the Act. I do not think it is democratic procedure to say that a certain
class of people cannot take advantage of legislation on our statute book
to better their own condition, particularly when their own profession has
failed to do that.”25
MP Gillis: “I would point out that there is nothing compulsory in the bill. If it
applied to doctors, lawyers, engineers and what have you, the first thing they
would have to do would be to conform with the mechanics of the bill, form a
trade union, get certification and all the rest of it. If they did not want to do
that, there is nothing in the bill that compels them to.”
MP Johnston: “Personally, I would have no objection to doctors obtaining
collective agreements if they desired to. I would not have any objection to
allowing lawyers to enter into a collective agreement if they themselves desire
it.”26

A secondary concern raised by opponents of the professional exclusion
provision was that the list of professions excluded was random and that other
professions had already come forward asking to be excluded as well and more
would do so later. This would create confusion and inconsistency and therefore
the law should just cover professional employees in the same manner as
other employees. This concern is reflected in the following comments made
during Committee:
MP Archibald: “I should like to ask the Minister if it would not be
practical to drop all of [the professional exclusion subsection]? You have
mentioned certain professionals there, skilled and unskilled. If you are
going to mention any professions why do you not include preachers,
chartered accountants and politicians? Why single these people out and
give them status of being above and beyond the ordinary hoi polloi? I
would suggest the removal of that. Then, as the Minister has already
pointed out, it would fall back to themselves for labour relations, and
they have good sense and all the rest of it. Leave it out. Then there would
be no fight over who was a professional man.”27
MP Skey: “I should like to ask the Minister again if we are not already
getting into a position whereby people like chemists and geologists, and
so on, are asking for inclusion in their professional status, and if we would
not have any number of other groups coming before the government or
before the labour relations board asking in many other ways. We would
have many other groups of employees and their professional associations.
25. See ibid at 209.
26. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates,
20-4, No 1 (13 May 1948) at 204.
27. Ibid at 205.
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Would the deletion of the clause not save the government a tremendous
amount of trouble in the future and place the whole onus on the board
for deciding their status?”28

Some members of the Committee proposed an amendment to the Bill
to permit professionals to organize and be certified in their own bargaining
unit to guard against them being swept into a larger “all employee” unit
that included manual or clerical labourers.29 The American Taft-Hartley
Act, enacted a year earlier in June 1947, had amended the National
Labor Relations Act to ensure that “professional employees” (including
lawyers) would not be swept into a bargaining unit with non-professional
employees unless a majority of the professionals voted to join that
broader unit. The concern about professionals being included in larger
non-professional units included both a practical labour relations element
related to a lack of community of interest, and a classist or elitist element
expressed as a concern that professionals must not be forced to become
“trade unionists.” This idea that professionals should be able to associate
and engage in collective bargaining if they so desire, but that they should
not be compelled to join “trade unions” appears at various points in the
Committee debates. For example, MP McInnes emphasized that removing
the professional exclusion provision, “does not make trade unionists of
engineers. I want to ease the minds of these professional people on that
point. It does not degrade them. This Act does not compel bargaining as
trade unions.”30
Confronted with these objections, Minister of Labour Humphrey
Mitchell provided a straightforward explanation for the decision to include
the professional exclusion in the Bill: the relevant national associations
had requested the exclusion and the government should respect the wishes
of these associations. Minister of Labour Mitchell gave the following
speech in Committee on 13 May 1948:
Hon. Mr. Mitchell: “We spent a good deal of time on the drafting of this
legislation. What we did was we forwarded imperfect ideas to all of the
national organizations in the country, labour organizations, professional
organizations…and employer’s organizations. What is going to be the

28. Ibid at 207.
29. Ibid at 203; House of Commons Committees, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations,
House of Commons Debates, 20-4, No 1 (18 May 1948) at 236.
30. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates,
20-4, No 1 (13 May 1948) at 228. See also MP Adamson: “the one thing we are trying to prevent is
to have professional men as a trade union…. My intention certainly was to keep the profession as
a profession and keep them separate and outside a trade union.”: House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates, 20-4, No 1 (18 May 1948) at 235.
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yardstick? We took this as the yardstick, that the expression of the
national organization speaking for their constituent members was the
majority voice of the profession. That is why that is there. When you
come to the medical profession and they pass a resolution and say, “We
want to be excluded from certain legislation,” then on a fundamental
question like that I think you have got to give some respect to the
viewpoint expressed by that organization. The same thing applies to
lawyers, dentists, architects and now we have got to the engineers. As
I said before there is nothing to prevent those people from forming an
organization, and I expressed my own opinion that if they did so and
they asked for the conciliation services of my department they would
certainly get them.
That is the position we are in. What are you going to do? Are you going
to listen to the majority opinion of the organizations, or are you not?
Whatever you may do about the engineers I think we are certainly
obliged to have the lawyers, doctors, architects, and the dentists in the
bill. The only reason this discussion has come up is because there is a
group inside a profession who feel that particular word ‘engineer’ should
be excluded from the bill.31

And again, on 17 June 1948:
Hon. Mr. Mitchell: I have always taken the view that you should listen to
the representations made by the parent organizations…. In my judgment
due weight had to be given to their representations. It may be proved
to these organizations and their membership in the light of experience
that their judgement was unsound. If so, then will be the time to amend
the section. With labour you listen in the main to representatives from
the national organizations and similarly with representations from the
employers. The representations we received from the organizations and
from professional groups which obtained their status as professional men from
provincial legislatures were very powerful.32

Other MPs agreed with the Minister’s rationale of deference to
the professional associations. For example, MP Timmins said to the
Committee: “Speaking for myself as a lawyer and having regard to the
representations made to the minister and his department in drawing this
clause, the legal profession has said it desired to have lawyers excluded from
this Act. I think we should be guided by that.”33 Therefore, the historical
justification for the introduction of the lawyer exclusion into Canadian
31. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates,
20-4, No 1 (13 May 1948) at 208 [emphasis added].
32. House of Commons Debates, Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 20-4 No 6,
(17 June 1948) at 5368.
33. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates,
20-4, No 1 (13 May 1948) at 210.
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collective bargaining law was that the CBA requested it.34 There was no
argument presented in the House of Commons or at the IR Committee
that collective bargaining by the relatively few lawyers who were
employed at that time was somehow inappropriate due to the nature of
legal practice.
Some MPs questioned whether the national association representing
engineers fairly represented the interests of employed engineers as opposed
to the interests of the management class of the profession. For example,
MP Gillis argued in the IR Committee: “I said several times, and I reiterate
it now, I do not think the institute [of professional engineers], as such,
is speaking for the majority of the employee engineers. They represent
largely the managerial end of the profession.”35 There was no discussion in
the Hansards of a comparable argument that the CBA’s position supporting
the exclusion of practicing lawyers in 1948 represented the position of the
management, sole-practitioner component of the legal profession rather
than that of “employed” lawyers. However, there can be little doubt that
was the case. In the 1940s, the CBA was an organization that represented
almost exclusively male, self-employed legal practitioners who would
not have been eligible to unionize under the IRDIA even if the exclusion
were not included in the legislation. We would not expect to find a strong
voice within the CBA of that period advocating for the rights of employed
lawyers to unionize and engage in collective bargaining.36
As intended, the IRDIA served as the template for collective bargaining
legislation at the provincial level. By 1955, every province except
Saskatchewan had enacted collective bargaining legislation modelled
after the IRDIA that included the professional exclusion in language either
identical to or closely modelled after that found in the IRDIA, including:

34. Not all professional associations that requested to be excluded received their wish. The
government received requests to be excluded from organizations representing dieticians, land
surveyors, chemists, and physicists but none of these professions were excluded. There was little
explanation provided by government officials as to why only five professions were excluded. In
rejecting the dieticians’ request, Mitchell stated simply that dieticians, “do not stand in the same class
as the professions of engineering, architecture, dentistry, medicine and the like”: House of Commons,
Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 20-4, No 6 (17 June 1948) at 5365.
35. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Industrial Relations, House of Commons Debates,
20-4, No 1 (13 May 1947) at 212.
36. The minutes of proceedings for the 1948 CBA Conference referenced the “good work” of the
newly formed Industrial Relations Section in lobbying for changes to Bill 195, which was “praised on
every hand” for “putting forward the lawyer’s viewpoint on labour relations”: “The Thirtieth Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association” (1948) 26:7 Can Bar Rev 1097 at 1100.
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Nova Scotia (introduced in 1947),37 Ontario (1948),38 Manitoba (1948),39
New Brunswick (1949),40 Alberta (1950),41 Newfoundland and Labrador
(1950),42 and British Columbia (1954).43 Prince Edward Island followed
in 1962.44 Quebec’s Labour Relations Act of 1944 had excluded lawyers,
however, the Professional Syndicates Act of 1925 recognized and protected
rights of professionals to organize associations and unions and to bargain
enforceable collective agreements that did not include majoritarianism
and exclusivity.45 In every instance, the language excluding lawyers from
coverage was introduced without debate or controversy at the provincial
level as part of the adoption of the broader package of labour legislation
modelled after the IRDIA. In this way, the request by the CBA to be
excluded from federal labour legislation in 1948 had the indirect effect
of excluding practicing lawyers from provincial collective bargaining
legislation everywhere in Canada except Saskatchewan, where employed
lawyers have always been treated the same as other employees.
II. The Woods Task Force, ILO Convention 87, and the dismantling of
the lawyer exemption in most Canadian jurisdictions
Little attention was paid to the professional exclusion within Canadian
labour policy circles until the late 1960s, when the “Woods Task Force”
was established to study possible reforms to the Canada Labour Code.
The SCC has described the final report released in 1968 and entitled
Canadian Industrial Relations: Report of the Federal Task Force on
Labour Relations as “Canada’s leading Task Force on Labour Relations.”46
The report advocated for an inclusive approach to legislative protections
for collective bargaining and the extensive list of exemptions found in
Canadian labour relations legislation was identified as a problem requiring
“corrective action.”47

37. Trade Union Act, SNS 1947, s 2(1)(i)(ii).
38. Labour Relations Act, SO 1948, c 51. This legislation was largely a placeholder that granted
the Lieutenant Governor in Council to enact regulations that mirrored the federal IRDIA once that
legislation was enacted. In December 1948, after the IRDIA had been enacted in June of that year,
Ontario Regulation 279/48 was filed. That Regulation (section 1(1)(h)) included the professional
exclusion found in the IRDIA, including employed practicing lawyers.
39. Labour Relations Act, SM 1948, c 27, s 2(1)(i).
40. Labour Relations Act, SNB 1949, s 2(1)(i).
41. An Act to Amend the Alberta Labour, Act, SA 1950,c 34, s 18.
42. Labour Relations Act, SN 1950, No. 15, s 2(i).
43. Labour Relations Act, SBC 1954, c 17, s 2(1).
44. Industrial Relations Act, SPEI 1962, c 19, s 1(i).
45. Labour Relations Act, RSQ 1944, c 30, s 2(a); Professional Syndicates Act, RS 1925, c 255, s 1.
46. Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94 at para 41 [Dunmore].
47. Woods Task Force, supra note 8 at para 250.
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In a research study prepared for the Task Force, Professor Shirley
Goldenberg argued that collective bargaining was compatible with
professional ethics and that the professional exclusion should be removed.48
She noted that there could be occasions in which lawyers perform an
essential service such that a work stoppage could jeopardize a “vital
public interest.” In those cases, restrictions on the right to strike would
be justified. However, Goldenberg cautioned that where the right to strike
is restricted it is incumbent upon the government to ensure those workers
receive a “fair deal.”49 This observation foreshadowed Justice Abella’s
comments in the 2015 decision in Saskatchewan Federation of Labour
v Saskatchewan in which the SCC recognized a constitutional right to
strike. Goldenberg argued that professional licensing bodies, such as law
societies, should be “ruled out” as the bargaining agent that represents
professionals in collective bargaining, noting that “it would be undesirable
to combine in one body the public interest function of licensing with the
private interest function of bargaining.”50
Ultimately, the Woods Task Force recommended that collective
bargaining coverage be extended to professionals and, accepting the advice
of Professor Goldenberg, that the licensing body for the professional not
be the collective bargaining representative for professional employees.51
The federal government did not immediately act upon the Task Force
recommendations. However, on 23 March 1972, the government ratified
ILO Convention 87, Concerning Freedom of Association and the
Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948. Convention 87 requires that
states give effect to the protected right of all employees “without distinction
whatsoever” to join a union or association of the employees’ choosing, to
engage in collective bargaining, and to strike.52 The following week, the
government introduced Bill C-183, An Act to Amend the Canada Labour
Code, which removed the professional exclusion from the Canada Labour
Code.

48. Goldenberg, supra note 8 at 96.
49. Ibid at 97-98; Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 [SFL].
50. Goldenberg, supra note 8 at 98-99. Goldenberg argued that professional associations that control
access to could restrict numbers to improve their own self-interest in bargaining. Also, the fact that
professional associations will inevitably include members who are employees and members who are
employers creates a potential conflict of interest. Goldenberg preferred that independent trade unions
represent professionals.
51. Woods Task Force, supra note 8 at para 441.
52. “Convention 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention,”
(1948), No , art 2, online: International Labour Organization <222.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NOR
MLEXUB:12100:0::NO::p12100_instrument_id:312232> [perma.cc/SP8X-5FPY]. Article 9 provides
an exception for the armed forces and police only.
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In his introductory remarks at first reading, Minister of Labour Martin
O’Connell referenced the recent ratification of Convention 87 and its
requirement for collective bargaining rights to be extended to all workers,
including professionals. He then noted:
The bill would extend bargaining rights to professional employees who
until now have not been entitled to bargain collectively. We believe that
these people have tended in recent years to be put into a kind of no man’s
land between management on the one side and the organized worker on
the other, without the right to be certified. We propose to rectify this. But
in doing so we recognize that professional employees have specialized
knowledge and training and that they may choose to have their own
bargaining unit.53

The new law introduced a definition of “professional employee” and
directed that a bargaining unit comprised of only professionals was
appropriate unless such a unit would otherwise not be appropriate, that a
unit comprised of more than one profession may be appropriate, and that
a person performing the functions of a professional but lacking the formal
qualification could be included in a unit with the professionals. Today, the
same basic model appears in section 27 of the Canada Labour Code.54
Following the federal government’s ratification of ILO Convention 87
and the repeal of the professional exclusion in the Canada Labour Code
in 1972, most Canadian provinces amended their collective bargaining
legislation to follow suit, including: Manitoba (in 1972),55 British Columbia
(1975),56 and Newfoundland and Labrador (1977).57 New Brunswick (in
1971)58 and Quebec (1964)59 had repealed the lawyer exclusion earlier and
Saskatchewan had never excluded professionals. Some of the provinces
included special rules pertaining to the appropriate bargaining unit, such
as a direction that a unit comprised solely of lawyers or professionals was
deemed to be appropriate or that professionals could not be included in
a unit of non-professionals unless a majority of the professionals voted
in favour of such an arrangement. However, for the most part, once the
lawyer exclusion was removed, employed practicing lawyers were treated
like any other employee covered by the collective bargaining legislation.
53. House of Commons, Committee of the Whole, House of Commons Debates, 28-4, No 2 (29
March 1972) at 1269.
54. Canada Labour Code, RSC 1985, c L-2, s 27.
55. Manitoba Labour Relations Act, 1972, c. 75, s. 1(t), s. 29(3)
56. Labour Code of British Columbia Amendment Act, 1975, c 33, s 1(b). See Paul Weiler,
Reconcilable Differences: New Directions for Labour Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) at 35 (discussing
the decision to include professionals in the 1975 BC Labour Code).
57. Labour Relations Act, SN 1950 No 15, s 2(u), s 39.
58. Industrial Relations Act, SNB 1971, c 9, s 2(5).
59. Labour Code, RSQ 1964, c 141, s 20.
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The only provinces to retain the lawyer exclusion beyond the 1970s were
Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia, and PEI. Table 1 summarizes the status of
the lawyer exclusion in each of Canada’s jurisdictions as of 2021.
Table 1: History of Adoption and Repeal (where applicable) of the
Lawyer Exemption in Principle Private Sector Collective Bargaining Statutes

* The Exclusionary Provinces

There was little or no political debate about the removal of the lawyer
exclusion in those provinces that repealed the exclusion during the 1960s
and 1970s. The provinces simply followed the federal lead just as they
had done in introducing the exclusion initially in the 1940s and 1950s.
Removing the exclusion was consistent with Canada’s ratification of
Convention 87 and with the recommendations of the Woods Task Force
and therefore extending collective bargaining rights to professionals,
including employed lawyers, was in step with the mood of the time in
favour of broad access to the statutorily protected collective bargaining
rights.
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III. The practice of lawyer collective bargaining in the inclusionary
provinces
With the exclusion removed, many lawyers60 employed in the private
sector in the Inclusionary Provinces joined unions and are today covered
by collective agreements. Some collective agreements that cover
practicing lawyers include provisions that address the lawyers’ ethical and
professional obligations as members of the law bar. Typical is the following
language found in a collective agreement between the Manitoba Legal Aid
Lawyers’ Association and Legal Aid Services Society of Manitoba:
9.01 Each employee shall observe standards of behaviour consistent with his
functions and role as a public servant and as a member of the Law Society
of Manitoba and in compliance with the terms of this Agreement and the
employee shall observe his oath of office and oath of allegiance where he
has taken an oath of allegiance.61

Similarly, an agreement between the Professional Employees’ Association
of BC and the Family Maintenance Agency permits covered lawyers to
refuse employer directions that, in the lawyer’s opinion, would require
them to violate an ethical standard.62 However, other than lawyer-specific
clauses such as these, a half-century of collective bargaining by practicing
lawyers employed in the private sector across Canada has demonstrated
there is nothing special about employed lawyers that warrants exclusion
from collective bargaining legislation. Collective bargaining has proven
time and again to be an adaptable institution.
Some governments that extended statutory collective bargaining
protections to private-sector lawyers delayed doing the same for their own
employees. The federal Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967, which
extended collective bargaining rights to federal public-sector employees,
excluded lawyers employed in the department of justice; that exclusion
was not removed until April 2005.63 One year later, the Association of
60. It is difficult to tabulate the precise numbers of unionized lawyers in Canada because in the
private sector, lawyers are sometimes included in broader bargaining units that include non-lawyers.
As part of this research, I contacted unions that represent bargaining units that include practicing
lawyers as part of an informal survey of the number of unionized lawyers. This is obviously an
unscientific method of calculation. Unionized lawyers are most commonly employed by unions as
in-house legal counsel and by legal clinics and other “progressive” employers.
61. “Agreement between the Province of Manitoba and Legal Aid Manitoba and the Legal Aid
Lawyers’ Association 2019–2022” (29 September 2021) at 6, online (pdf): Government of Manitoba
<www.gov.mb.ca/csc/labour/pubs/pdf/agreements/legal_aid.pdf> [perma.cc/7CDC-HBVR]
62. Eighth Collective Agreement: Between THEMIS Program Management & Consulting Limited
and the Professional Employees Association” (2019) art 26.4, online (pdf): PEA <pea.org/system/files/
FMEP-Eighth- Collective-Agreement-FINAL.pdf> [perma.cc/E6D3-362P].
63. Public Service Labour Relations Act, SC 2003, c 22.
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Justice Counsel (AJC) was certified to represent lawyers employed in
the federal public service.64 Today, the AJC represents approximately
2600 lawyers employed by the government of Canada. The AJC and the
Treasury Board have concluded four collective agreements since the AJC
was certified. They have agreed to refer collective bargaining disputes to
binding determination under section 182 of the PSLRA.65
Newfoundland and Labrador, which extended coverage to privatesector lawyers in 1977, continues to exclude lawyers “employed in the
Department of Justice as legislative counsel” from its Public Service
Collective Bargaining Act, and although the province’s crown attorneys
have an association, it has never bargained a collective agreement on
behalf of the employees.66 Civil lawyers employed by the Newfoundland
government are not presently represented by any employee association.
In British Columbia, the Public Service Labour Relations Act still defines
“employee” as excluding “a practicing lawyer or articled student…who is
engaged in the practice of law.”67 However, in October 2000, the Crown
Counsel Act was amended to recognize the BC Crown Counsel Association
(BCCCA), a society incorporated under the Society Act, as the exclusive
bargaining agent for all crown counsel and to require the BCCCA and
the employer (the BC Public Service Agency) to bargain in good faith
and make reasonable efforts to conclude agreements that include “matters
affecting wages or salary, hours of work and other working conditions.”68
Approximately 450 crown counsel are represented by BCCCA. The parties
have bargained collective agreements that govern working conditions of
crown counsel in BC and that include access to grievance and disputes
arbitration, and processes for resolving collective bargaining disputes,
including access to binding interest arbitration. Arbitrators have decided
bargaining disputes under this process.69
The British Columbia Government Lawyers Association (BCGLA) is
incorporated under the Societies’ Act of BC and represents civil lawyers
64. Federal Law Officers of the Crown v Treasury Board of Canada, 2006 PSLRB 45 (CanLII)
65. See Treasury Board and Association of Justice Counsel, “Determination of outstanding issues
tied to the renewing the 2014–2018 collective agreement,” (10 July 2018), online (pdf): Association
of Justice Counsel <www.ajc-ajj.ca/sites/default/files/2019/12/2018_arbitral_award.pdf> [perma.cc/
UY9Y-YZVH]
66. Public Service Collective Bargaining Act, RSNL 1990, c P-42, s 2(1(i)(ix)). The union is known
as Newfoundland and Labrador Crown Attorneys Association (NLCAA).
67. Public Service Labour Relations Act, RSBC 1996, c 388, s 1 [PSLRA].
68. Crown Counsel Act, RSBC 1996, c 87, s 4.1(1).
69. See “Agreement between the BC Public Service Agency and BC Crown Counsel Association,”
(last visited 20 June 2022), online (pdf): Government of British Columbia <www2.gov.bc.ca/
assets/gov/careers/managerssupervisors/managing-employee-labour-relations/crown_counsel_
agreement_15.pdf> [perma.cc/3MTP-ASZJ].
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employed by the government. In contrast to the formalized bargaining
process in place for crown counsel, the government has historically
refused to recognize the BCGLA as the exclusive legal bargaining agent
representing these employees. Since the civil lawyers are excluded
from the PSLRA, the BCGLA has no statutory mechanism to require the
government to engage in collective bargaining. However, in 2015, the
province acknowledged that the SCC decisions in MPAO and SFL required
that collective bargaining rights be extended to civil lawyers employed by
the state.70 The government proposed a process for collective bargaining
and indicated its intention to remove the exclusion of civil lawyers from
the PSLRA. In August 2019, the BCGLA commenced a Charter challenge
asserting that the exclusion of lawyers from the PSLRA infringed section
2(d), as did the government’s proposed plan to sweep the lawyers into
a broader “all professionals” bargaining unit. That action remained
outstanding at the time of writing in summer 2021.
New Brunswick similarly conceded that the exclusion of public-sector
lawyers from coverage under collective bargaining legislation could no
longer be justified after the SCC’s recent expansive re-interpretation of
section 2(d) freedom of association. In 2009, the government removed
a provision excluding lawyers previously found in the PSLRA following
a Court of Queen’s Bench ruling that the exclusion of “casuals” in the
same legislation contravened section 2(d).71 In his introduction of Bill
80, An Act to Amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act, Minister
of Human Resources Rick Brewer indicated that the government was
extending collective bargaining rights to government lawyers to bring the
province in line with the SCC’s decision in BC Health Services, which had
recognized a right to collective bargaining.72
Quebec’s crown prosecutors are afforded a right to collective bargaining
under an Act Respecting the Process for Determining the Remuneration of
Criminal and Penal Prosecuting Attorneys and Respecting their Collective
70. In its Response to the Notice of Civil Claim, the government agreed with the BCGLA’s
pleading that: “In August 2015, the Province acknowledged that Civil Lawyers had a right to bargain
collectively and expressed willingness to offer them access to a ‘more meaningful process of collective
bargaining as determined by the Supreme Court of Canada’”: British Columbia Government Lawyers
Associationon Its Own Behalf and on Behalf of All Its Members v Her Majesty the Queen in Right
of the Province of British Columbia, BCSC File No 198773 at para 1 (Response to Civil Claim, 13
September 2019).
71. CUPE v PNB, 2009 NBQB 164. The exclusion of casuals was repealed in April 2010: An Act to
Amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act, SNB 2010, c 20.
72. New Brunswick, Legislative Assembly, Offical Report of Debates (Hansard) (22 May 2009) at
22: “The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled in other jurisdictions that the right to join a union is protected
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. With this amendment, we are demonstrating the
commitment of the province of New Brunswick to respect the Supreme Court’s ruling.”
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Bargaining Plan (Prosecutors’ Act).73 Crown prosecutors, represented by
the Association of Attorney-General’s Prosecutors of Quebec (ASPGQ),
have engaged in strike action on multiple occasions since 1986.74 Nonprosecuting lawyers and notaries in Quebec employed by the state
are represented by an association recognized under the Professional
Syndicates Act known today as Les avocats et notaires de l’État Québécois
(LANEQ). LANEQ members have a statutory right to strike under the
Quebec Labour Code subject to certain rules requiring essential service
designations to be agreed or imposed by the Administrative Labor Tribunal
(Essential Services Division).75 Collective bargaining between the Quebec
government and ASPGQ and LANEQ has often been contentious, leading
to a number of strikes over the years, a complaint to the ILO’s Expert
Committee on Freedom of Association (the CFA ordered the government
to comply with Convention 87 and 98),76 and recent rulings by the Superior
Court and Court of Appeal that back-to-work legislation violated section
2(d) and was not saved by section 1 of the Charter.77
IV. Still, they persisted: the continued lawyer exclusion in Alberta,
Ontario, Nova Scotia, and PEI
The preceding discussion demonstrates a long history of collective
bargaining by practicing, employed lawyers across Canada in both the
private and public sectors. Thousands of Canadian lawyers are covered by
collective agreements. Nevertheless—Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia, and
PEI78—have stubbornly persisted with professional exclusion.
73. Act Respecting the Process for Determining the Remuneration of Criminal and Penal Prosecuting
Attorneys and Respecting their Collective Bargaining Plan, 2005, c P-27.1.
74. “Quebec Prosecutors, government lawyers on strike,” Global News (8 February 2011), online
(pdf): <globalnews.ca/news/108696/quebec-prosecutors-government-lawyers-on-strike-3/> [perma.
cc/X3CA-DJ35]; An Act to Amend the Act Respecting Attorney General’s Prosecutors and the Labour
Code, CQLR c 22.
75. Civil Service Act, CQLJ c F-3.1, s 69. For a Tribunal decision considering essential services
designation in relation to LANEQ members, see: Quebec (Government of) (Department of
Professional Relations, Treasury Board) and Lawyers and Notaries of the Quebec State, 2016 QCTAT
6023 (CanLII).
76. “Report in which the committee requests to be kept informed of development: Report No 344”
(2007), online (pdf): International Labour Organization <www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:7
0006:0::NO:70006:P70006_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID,P70006_PARAGRAPH_NO:2910179,407>
[perma.cc/UPK6-H8ES].
77. Les avocats et notaires de l’État québécois c Procureure générale du Québec, 2019 QCCS 3897,
aff’d 2021 QCCA 559; Procureur général du Québec c Les avocats et notaires de l’État québécois,
2021 QCCA 559, leave for appeal to SCC refused, 39695 (14 October 2021).
78. PEI introduced the Industrial Relations in 1962 which excluded professionals, including
practicing lawyers. Today the professional exclusion appears in section 7(2) of the Labour Act. There
is no PEI Hansard for the period in which the professional exclusion was introduced, and I have
been unable to locate any discussion by politicians or the government that explains the government’s
justification for the lawyer exclusion.
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Nova Scotia introduced the professional exclusion, including practicing
lawyers, in the 1947 Trade Union Act, using the same language as the
federal IRDIA.79 There was no Hansard before 1950, and I was unable to
locate any justification by a public official for the exclusion either from
this earlier period or the present day. Today the lawyer exclusion is found
in section 2(2) of the Trade Union Act.80 The NS Civil Service Collective
Bargaining Act also excludes practicing lawyers.81 Notwithstanding the
statutory exclusion, the NS Crown Attorneys Association (NSCAA) has
persuaded the government to come to the bargaining table by threatening
and engaging in strike action over the years. Over 90 per cent of crown
attorneys participated in a 1998 strike over compensation and other
working conditions. This strike led the province in 2000 to recognize the
NSCAA as the exclusive representative of crown attorneys and enter into
a framework agreement that establishes a system of collective bargaining
that includes access to conciliation and interest arbitration to resolve
bargaining disputes.82 The parties have resorted to interest arbitration to
resolve bargaining disputes on multiple occasions since 2000.83 The crown
attorneys are the exception to the general rule that employed lawyers in
Nova Scotia are effectively blocked from collective bargaining, and they
won collective bargaining rights the old-fashioned way, by engaging in
extra-statutory strikes.
The lawyer exclusion has been in place in Alberta since 1950.84 A search
of the Alberta Legislative Library Scrapbook Hansard for that session
of Parliament found no references to or discussion of the professional
exclusion when it was introduced. There are a handful of lawyers
employed by unions in Alberta who are covered by broader “all employee”
79. Labour Relations Act, SN 1950, No 15, s 2(i). Nova Scotia introduced the exclusion prior to
the passage of the IRDIA, modelled after the language that had been included in the original Bill
338 adopted by the federal government in 1947. As noted earlier, Bill 338 lapsed and Bill 195 was
introduced in 1948 and enacted as the IRDIA later that year.
80. Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475.
81. Civil Service Collective Bargaining Act, RSNS 1989, c 71, s 11(2)(g).
82. Shelagh MR Campbell, Continental Drift in the Legal Profession: The Struggle for Collective
Bargaining by Nova Scotia’s Crown Prosecutors (PhD Dissertation, St Mary’s University, 2010) at 193
[unpublished], online (pdf): Patrick Power Library, SMU <library2.smu.ca/xmlui/handle/01/23268>
[perma.cc/W53H-4SRP].
83. See “Employment Agreement between the Province of Nova Scotia and the Nova Scotia
Crown Attorneys’ Association” (1 April 2015), online (pdf): Nova Scotia <novascotia.ca/psc/
pdf/employeeCentre/collectiveAgreements/NS_Crown_Attorneys_Agreement_April_1_2015_-_
March_31_2019.pdf> [perma.cc/V2D2-M6YY]; Nova Scotia (Human Resources) v Nova Scotia
Crown Attorney’s Association, 2008 CanLII 92148 (Arbitrators: JA MacLellan & Donald H
McDougall), <https://canlii.ca/t/j6nsd>.
84. An Act to Amend the Alberta Labour Act, SA 1950, c 34, s 18. Today the exclusion appears in
section 1(l)(ii) of the Labour Relations Code.
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bargaining units in Alberta as a result of voluntary recognition.85 However,
this type of voluntary recognition is exceedingly rare. The exclusion of
lawyers from the Labour Relations Code has mostly ensured that lawyers
in Alberta do not have access to collective bargaining. The Public Service
Employees Relations Act also excludes practicing lawyers, but it includes
a curious provision that permits the Alberta Labour Relations Board to
nevertheless include lawyers in a statutorily mandated “all employee”
bargaining unit represented by the Alberta Union of Public Employees
if it is satisfied that a majority of lawyers and persons training to become
lawyers employed by the government wish to be included in that unit.86 In
a 2019 decision, the Labour Board ruled that this statutory scheme did not
infringe section 2(d) of the Charter by prohibiting crown attorneys from
organizing a separate bargaining unit represented by the Alberta Crown
Attorneys’ Association (ACAA).87
Ontario’s history regarding the lawyer exclusion is more complicated
than the other provinces. The beginning of the story is familiar. Ontario
introduced the lawyer exclusion initially by means of a regulation in late
1948 when it incorporated the IRDIA into provincial law.88 The Labour
Relations Act, 1950 later consolidated earlier legislation and regulations
into a unified labour code and the lawyer exclusion became part of that
legislation.89 There was limited discussion about the exemption at that
time. The only reference to the professional exclusion in the Hansard for
this period is a comment made on 5 April 1950, by MPP Joe Salsberg
of the Labour-Progressive Party, who argued that the exclusion of
professionals from the Labour Relations Act was “wrong in principle”
and that it should be left to employed professionals to decide if they wish
to exercise collective bargaining rights under the statute. MPP Salsberg
also predicted correctly that the ranks of lawyers and other professionals
employed by governments would continue to grow and that there was no
justification for excluding them from collective bargaining laws.90 There is
85. For example, lawyers employed by the Health Services Association of Alberta are covered by a
collective agreement.
86. Public Service Employee Relations Act, RSA 2000, c P-4, s 1(1), s 13.
87. Alberta Crown Attorneys’ Association v Alberta (Justice and Solicitor General), [2019] Alta
LRBR 337, 42 CLRBR (3d) 57, rev’d 2021 ABQB 949. The Board noted that if its conclusion that the
statutory prohibition on crown attorneys forming their bargaining unit was constitutionally permissible
was incorrect, then it would have ruled that exclusion of lawyers from the PSERA violates section
2(d), given that the evidence demonstrated that the ACAA had in practice been unable to engage in
meaningful collective bargaining due to exclusion from the PSERA.
88. O Reg 279/48, s 1(1)(h).
89. Labour Relations Act, SO 1950, c 34, s 3.
90. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), C-1 (5 April 1950) at 495496.
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no recorded response by the government officials to these objections and
the law passed with the professional exclusion, where it remained until
1992.
That year, an NDP-led government repealed the long-standing
professional exemption as part of a package of reforms included in Bill 40,
Labour Relations and Employment Statute Amendment Act, introduced on
4 June 1992. The new law extended coverage to the previously excluded
five professions. It deemed that a unit comprised solely of members of a
single profession is appropriate, while a unit with professionals and other
employees was appropriate only if a majority of the professionals wish to
be included in the broader unit.91 Once again, there was little discussion in
the legislative debates leading to the enactment of Bill 40 on 5 November
1992 about the extension of collective bargaining to professionals. The
elimination of the professional exclusion was raised a few times in the
meetings of the Standing Committee on Resources Development (Standing
Committee). On 4 August 1992, Deputy Minister of Labour Jim Thomas
commented that one area of reform targeted by Bill 40 was enhancing the
ability to organize. In that vein, he observed: “Professional employees and
domestics, formerly excluded from the right to organize under the act, and
not permitted to organize under the act, are now permitted to organize, just
as in most other jurisdictions.”92
Labour organizations were uniformly supportive of the removal of the
professional exclusion. However, there was concern expressed in some
quarters about the possibility of strikes by lawyers who they argued provide
essential services. For example, the Ontario Association of Children’s Aid
Society requested that lawyers who provide “mandatory services” either
continue to be excluded or that the law’s new rules restricting replacement
workers be relaxed to ensure continued services in the event of a work
stoppage.93 In comments before the Standing Committee, opposition
Conservative MPP Elizabeth Witmer referenced the OACAS’s concerns
and argued that the professional exclusion should be maintained due to the
threat of strikes:
The reason for the original exclusion was the perceived inconsistency
between a professional’s obligation to his or her clients and the right
to strike. It was also thought that the right to bargain collectively is not
91. Bill 40, An Act to amend certain Acts concerning Collective Bargaining and Employment, 2nd
Sess, 35th Leg, Ontario, 1992 (assented to 5 November 1992), SO 1992, c 21, s 6(4).
92. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development (4 August
1992) at 1440.
93. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development (5 August
1992) at 1110.

The Stubborn Persistence of the Lawyer Exemption in
Canadian Collective Bargaining Legislation

89

critical to those individuals, because they are governed by their own
specific professional regulatory bodies. I would say at this time that the
rationale for the original exclusion continues and is very important in our
deliberations. I’m concerned that if we go ahead as the government has
proposed under Bill 40, professionals would be potentially in a conflictof-interest situation between their professional responsibilities and the
responsibilities and accountabilities that could be demanded by them by
virtue of belonging to a trade union.94

This was the extent of the debate regarding the removal of the professional
exclusion in 1992. The obvious rejoinder to MPP Witmer’s comments,
that truly essential lawyers could be granted a right to binding interest
arbitration like other essential workers, was not raised in the committee
discussions. The law received Royal Assent on 5 November 1992.
Once the lawyer exclusion was removed from the Labour Relations
Act, lawyers in Ontario quickly exercised their statutory right to unionize.
Between 1993 and 1995, a variety of unions representing bargaining units
comprised partially or exclusively of lawyers were either certified by the
OLRB or voluntarily recognized by employers.95 However, this movement
to organize employed lawyers was short-lived. In November 1995, the
newly elected Progressive Conservative government re-introduced the
professional exclusion and legislatively stripped lawyers from existing
bargaining units.96 Consistent with the pattern we have discussed, in debates
and in Committee, the government offered no explanation or rationale for
these actions beyond noting that repealing Bill 40 in its entirety had been
part of the Progressive Conservative’s election platform.
A relatively small number of practicing lawyers remain covered
by collective agreements in Ontario as a residue from the brief period
in which lawyers were covered by the Labour Relations Act because
their employers have voluntarily permitted their coverage to continue.97
Since 2017, the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU) has
obtained bargaining rights through voluntary recognition for a variety of
small bargaining units that include lawyers. In each case, the union filed
94. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Resources Development (8 October
1992) at 1700.
95. See Workers’ Compensation Board, [1995] OLRD No 875; Ombudsman Ontario, [1993] OLRD
No 466; Neighbourhood Legal Services (London & Middlesex) Inc, [1993] OLRD No 1039; Brant
County Community Legal Clinic, [1994] OLRD No 529.
96. Labour Relations Act, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A, s 7(2) [LRA].
97. The list of employers who permit their employed lawyers to be covered by a collective agreement
appears to be comprised exclusively of unions and law clinics, including Unifor, the Ontario Nurses
Union, Canadian Union of Public Employees, Canadian Association of University Teachers, Building
Trades Workers Services, and staff lawyers employed at Kensington-Bellwoods Community Legal
Services, Scarborough Community Legal Services, and Injured Workers’ Consultants.
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an application for certification at the OLRB, notwithstanding the lawyer
exclusion still found in the LRA. In four of the five applications, the
employer responded by pleading that the lawyers are excluded from the
legislation and therefore not eligible to be covered by the application for
certification.98 In each of those cases, OPSEU launched a Charter challenge
against the professional exclusion. This provocation motivated all four
employers to agree to a framework agreement requiring the employer to
voluntarily recognize OPSEU for a unit including lawyers provided that
a majority of the employees voted for OPSEU in a vote conducted by
the OLRB.99 OPSEU subsequently won all five votes and proceeded with
bargaining towards a first collective agreement.
This tactic of threatening a Charter challenge against the
constitutionally vulnerable lawyer exemption has helped other unions
obtain voluntary recognition agreements for units covering lawyers. For
example, lawyers employed by Legal Aid Ontario (LAO) obtained extrastatutory collective bargaining rights after their union, the Society of
Energy Professionals, launched a Charter challenge against the lawyer
exclusion in the Labour Relations Act in 2015.100 This action followed
upon a multi-year campaign by the lawyers and the Society to persuade
LAO to voluntarily recognize the Society and commence bargaining,
initially without success. LAO refused the Society’s advances, informing
the union that the statutory exclusion meant that LAO had no obligation to
recognize or bargain with the Society:
LAO does not have any legal obligation to voluntarily recognize a trade
union to represent employees to whom the [Ontario Labour Relations
Act] does not apply, nor to enter into a bargaining relationship with a
trade union entirely outside the established process and structure of the
OLRA.101
98. The four employers who relied upon the lawyer exemption to resist the application were
West Scarborough Community Legal Services, Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario, Canadian
Environmental Law Association, and Durham Community Legal Services. The Income Security
Advocacy Centre did not rely on the professional exclusion and agreed to voluntarily recognize
OPSEU provided a majority of employees voted for union representation in a vote conducted by the
OLRB: OPSEU v Income Security Advocacy Centre, 2017 CanLII 81380 (OLRB).
99. OPSEU v Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario, 2017 CanLII 81402 (OLRB); OPSEU v
Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2017 CanLII 81403 (OLRB); OPSEU v West Scarborough
Community Legal Services, 2019 CanLII 74860 (OLRB); OPSEU v Durham Community Legal Clinic,
2021 CanLII 106320 (OLRB).
100. “The Changing Workplaces Review” (6 November 2015) at 24-25, online (pdf): The Society
of Energy Professionals <d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/thesociety/pages/3941/attachments/
original/1595258280/Changing_Workplaces_Review_Society_Submission.pdf?1595258280>
[perma.cc/T34Q-XYUS].
101. Y.amri Taddese, “LAO Staff Lawyers’ Union Bid Rejected” Law Times (28 October 2013),
online:
<www.lawtimesnews.com/news/general/lao-staff-lawyers-union-bid-rejected/261068>
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The Charter challenge was scheduled to be argued in December 2016.102
However, in August 2016, with the Charter application looming, LAO
finally agreed to negotiate with the Society on behalf of LAO lawyers
towards a framework agreement for collective bargaining. In October
2016, a secret ballot vote was conducted. LAO staff lawyers voted
overwhelmingly in favour of unionization. Thereafter, LAO voluntarily
recognized the Society as the bargaining representative for a unit comprised
of non-managerial lawyers. The Charter challenge was withdrawn. In a
subsequent interest arbitration, Arbitrator William Kaplan agreed with
the Society’s position that the bargaining dispute resolution mechanism
should be binding interest arbitration and not the “traditional dispute
resolution model for collective bargaining” (strike/lockout), as argued by
LAO.103 The Society represents approximately 350 staff lawyers employed
at LAO.
The treatment of government lawyers in Ontario’s collective bargaining
legislation has followed a similar trajectory to that of their private-sector
counterparts. With a brief reprise during the NDP years of 1993–1995, the
Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act (CECBA) has excluded crown
attorneys and civil lawyers employed by the Ontario government.104 When
the NDP-led government proposed the removal of the lawyer exclusion in
the CECBA in 1993, the only concern expressed during the debates was
the possibility of disruption of essential government services in the event
of a work stoppage. The Law of Society of Upper Canada expressed in a
letter to the government that it “makes no submission” on the extension
of statutory collective bargaining rights to lawyers working for the crown
but argued that “crown attorneys in criminal proceedings or civil attorneys
who represent the government in other matters should not be given the right
to strike, and they do not want the right to strike.”105 Indeed, neither of the
associations that represented crown attorneys (Ontario Crown Attorney’s
Association, OCAA) and civil lawyers (Association of Law Officers of the

[perma.cc/7UC8-DBFC].
102. Jacques Gallant, “Legal Aid Lawyers Locked in Legal Battle with Province over Unionization,”
Toronto Star (13 August 2016), online: <www.thestar.com/news/gta/2016/08/13/legal-aid-lawyerslocked-in-legal-battle-with-province-over-unionization.html> [perma.cc/NA7R-9PRM].
103. Legal Aid Ontario v The Society of Energy Professionals, IFPTE Local 160 (2017), 131 CLAS
128, 2017 CanLII 26673 (Arbitrator: William Kaplan).
104. Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, SO 1972, c 67, s 1(1)(iv). Today the exclusion is
found in the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, SO 1993, c 38, s 1(1).
105. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reports of Debates (Hansard), 35-3, vol b (13 December
1993) at 2040 (Mr. Hanrick).
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Crown, ALOC) requested a right to strike, preferring interest arbitration
instead.106
The lawyer exemption was removed from the CECBA between
December 1993 and November 1995, at which time the Conservativeled government reinstated it. The exemption remains in the CEBCA
today, even though in practice the Ontario government—through both
Conservative and Liberal-led governments—has engaged in extrastatutory collective bargaining with OCAA and ALOC over terms and
conditions of employment of their members pursuant to a series of five
collectively bargained “framework agreements” since 1988.107 That
bargaining relationship was instigated by the “Weiler Report” of 1988,
which concluded that government lawyers should have a right to collective
bargaining like other employees.108 Weiler explained that the labour market
for professionals had changed considerably since the early postwar period
and that by 1988, “most of our prototype professionals are employed by
someone else, rather than work alone or in partnership with colleagues.”109
In 2000, Arbitrator Kaplan ordered a 30 per cent salary increase for
the crown lawyers.110 Following that award, the government informed the
associations that it was no longer prepared to accept binding arbitration
awards, and it proposed a new model in which the government could decline
to implement an arbitrated award. ALOC and OCAA ultimately agreed
to a revised model that addressed some of the government’s concerns.
However, they later asserted that they had done so “with a gun to our head”
because due to the statutory exclusion, without a framework agreement in
place the associations would have no legal relationship with the employer
that would protect a right to bargain.111 Finally, in July 2010, OCAA and
ALOC gave notice to the government that they intended to file a Charter
challenge under s 2(d) of the Charter regarding the constitutionality of the
lawyer exclusion in the CECBA. In August 2010, the associations agreed
not to proceed with the constitutional challenge as part of a settlement
resulting in a Fifth Framework Agreement that would operate until 2057
106. Ibid.
107. See Timothy Hadwen et al, Ontario Public Service Employment and Labour Law (Toronto:
Irwin, 2005) at 289.
108. Paul C Weiler, The Professional Employee in Government: A Report to the Honorable Murray
Elston, Chairman, Management Board of Cabinet, Government of Ontario, on the Appropriate
Methods for Establishing Salaries and Employment Conditions for Professional Employees of the
Government of Ontario (January 1988) at 29 (Chair: Murray Elston) [Weiler, Professional Employee].
109. Ibid at 32.
110. Association of Law Officers of the Crown and Ontario Crown Attorneys Association v Ontario
(Management Board of Cabinet), [2000] OLAA No 790 (QL) (Arbitrator: William Kaplan).
111. Association of Law Officers of the Crown v Ontario (Management Board of Cabinet), 2014
CanLII 87074 (Arbitrators: Louisa M. Davie, Chris Paliare, Paul Boniferro).
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and that included a revised bargaining dispute resolution process more
favourable to the associations.112 Today, ALOC represents approximately
750 lawyers employed by the Ontario government outside of the criminal
law division.113 The OCAA represents over 1000 assistant crown attorneys
and crown counsel.114
V. The treatment of the lawyer exclusion in academic and policy
literature
The lawyer exclusion has persisted in the Exclusionary Provinces
notwithstanding that every Canadian law reform report since 1968 and
every scholar who has considered the exclusion has recommended its
repeal. We already noted the 1968 report of the Woods Task Force, which
brought together Canada’s leading labour law and industrial relations
scholars and recommended that the professional exclusion be removed
from the Canada Labour Code, finding no justification for it. Weiler came
to the same conclusion in his 1988 report for the Ontario government
on professional bargaining in the public sector, concluding that:
(1) professionals, including lawyers, have significant concerns about the
employment conditions “which can only be effectively addressed through
some kind of group organization and dealings with their government
employer,” and (2) “that there is no inherent incompatibility between such
employee organization and their professional obligations.” Therefore,
he recommended that “the same basic right as is now enjoyed by just
about everyone else employed in this province and across the country”
be extended to professionals.115 This included extending unfair labour
practice provisions to professionals and a statutory model of collective
bargaining.116
More recently, the 2017 Ontario Changing Workplaces Review also
recommended the removal of the professional exclusion from the Ontario
Labour Relations Act.117 The Final Report noted that historically the
exclusion has been justified on the basis that “professionals were seen
112. See settlement preceding the Fifth Framework Agreement between OCAA, ALOC, and
the government provided at paragraph D(2): “The Employer and ALOC/OCAA agree that these
amendments to the Framework Agreement resolve any and all disputes regarding the constitutionality
of the exclusion from the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, 1993 pursuant to s. 1.1(3)
paragraph 5.”
113. “About ALOC” (last visited 25 February 2022), online: Association of Law Officers of the
Crown <www.aloc.ca/About-ALOC.aspx> [perma.cc/TE26-8EKN].
114. “About Us” (last visited 21 June 2022), online: Ontario Crown Attorney Association <www.
ocaa.ca/about-us/> [perma.cc/3MXQ-ZVNY].
115. Weiler, Professional Employee, supra note 108 at 71
116. Ibid at 60
117. “Changing Workplaces Review,” supra note 11 at 10.7, 139-142.
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as having adequate protection through their self-regulated professional
bodies.” There was also a concern that conflicts could arise between “a
professional’s continuing duty and obligation to his or her patients or
clients and the right to strike.” However, the special advisors concluded
that those concerns could not justify the exclusion. Harking back to
comments by some of the MPs during the 1940’s debates preceding the
passage of the IRDIA, the advisors noted that the selection of five out of
forty-six regulated professions in Ontario was random, and that obvious
solutions exist to address concerns about strikes by essential lawyers,
including a neutral interest arbitration process used by other essential
workers.118 Moreover, as noted earlier, the advisors concluded that the
exclusion of professionals was inconsistent with section 2(d) freedom of
association as mandated by the SCC, particularly in its 2015 decision in
MPAO.119 In his report on statutory exclusions for the CWR, Professor
Michael Lynk similarly concluded that as a result of MPAO, the complete
exclusion of an occupational category of employees from any statutory
access to collective bargaining is a presumptive breach of the Charter,
which could be saved only by a compelling justification from a Canadian
government under the section 1 analytical framework.120
The general pattern in the small body of academic literature that
considered the lawyer exclusion in the past was to identify presumptive
historical justifications for the exclusion in the early postwar period when
very few lawyers were “employed,” and to then proclaim that those early
justifications no longer apply. Historical justifications cited in the literature
for the lawyer exclusion can be summarized into three general categories:
(1) normative judgments about how lawyers ought to behave as
professionals and about the role and purpose of collective
bargaining and “trade unions”;
(2) arguments that lawyers do not need collective bargaining
because they are already well paid, are mostly self-employed
anyways, and already have representation by their professional
associations; and
(3) arguments that practical labour relations problems and
potential conflicts of interest would result if statutory
118. Ibid.
119. MPAO, supra note 10.
120. Michael Lynk, “A Review of the Employee Occupational Exclusion under the Ontario Labour
Relations Act, 1995” (2015) at 15, online (pdf): University of Toronto <cirhr.library.utoronto.ca/
sites/default/public/research-projects/Lynk-11-Exclusions%20Under%20LRA.pdf> [perma.cc/77NJ3UVA]. See also David Doorey, “Reflecting Back on the Future of Labour Law” (2021) 71:2 UTLJ
165 at 188.
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collective bargaining were extended to lawyers, particularly
relating the potential of strikes and conflicts of interest.121
Over time, the first two arguments came to be seen as outdated
and elitist, particularly as the proportion of professionals who are
“employees” of organizations expanded rapidly through the latter half of
the twentieth century and union representation expanded into the public
sector, white collar, and professional ranks.122 The argument that lawyers
are already represented by lawyer associations such as law societies and
bar associations was dismissed on the obvious basis that law societies
and bar associations do not bargain employment contracts on behalf of
employed lawyers. In addition, as recommended in the Woods Task Force,
concerns were expressed that the governing bodies of lawyers should not
be involved in bargaining working conditions and compensation on behalf
of employed lawyers because those organizations have control over labour
supply through licensing powers. The third argument has been addressed
through a variety of legislative devices, including special bargaining unit
rules that order or grant labour boards discretion to create professional
units and by substituting binding interest arbitration in cases of essential
services. In addition, as noted earlier, unions representing lawyers
have bargained collective agreement clauses that recognize lawyers’
professional obligations and clarify that collective agreement terms do not
diminish these obligations.
VI. The constitutional landscape: the lawyer exclusion and section 2(d)
For most of the period since the 1940s, the exclusion of professionals
raised no constitutional questions. After the Charter arrived on the scene in
1982, any thoughts that the guarantee of freedom of association in section
2(d) would mark a new era of expanded collective bargaining rights were
quickly shot down. The SCC, in the “First Labour Trilogy”123 in 1987 and
the 1990 PIPS decision,124 ruled that there was no Charter right to strike
or to engage in collective bargaining. Optimists who believed that section
121. See George W Adams, “Collective Bargaining By Salaried Professionals” (1977) 32:2 Industrial
Relations 184 at 193. Weiler, Professional Employee, supra note 108 at 29; M MacGuigan, supra note
7 at 33.
122. AWR Carrothers, “Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee” in John HG Crispo,
ed, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee: Conference Proceedings: December 1517, 1965 (Toronto: Centre for Industrial Relations, University of Toronto, 1966) 1 at 15-16. Weiler,
Professional Employee, supra note 108 at 32.
123. Reference re Alberta Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR (4th)
161; PSAC v Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424, 38 DLR (4th) 249; RWDSU v Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 SCR
460, 38 DLR (4th) 277 [Labour trilogy] (no Charter-protected right to strike).
124. Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v Northwest Territories (Commissioner),
[1990] 2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1 (no Charter right to collective bargaining).
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2(d) or section 15 equality rights would bring a swift end to occupational
exclusions from protective labour legislation were soon disappointed.125 In
its 1999 decision in Delisle v Canada (Deputy AG), the SCC confirmed that
there was nothing constitutionally suspect about the federal government’s
decision to exclude police officers from public sector collective bargaining
legislation.126 If the Charter did not protect collective bargaining, then
nothing stopped governments from cherry picking winners and losers
by excluding entire occupations from coverage under protective labour
legislation.
However, the constitutional landscape is much different today. The
story is well known and need not be repeated at length here.127 Suffice
to say, beginning with its 2001 decision in Dunmore, the SCC embarked
on a two-decade-long expansion of the substance of section 2(d) from a
very restricted vision of freedom of association to an expansive, generous,
and purposive interpretation. That odyssey has so far led the SCC to
recognize a constitutional right to collective bargaining and to strike.128 In
Dunmore, the SCC ruled that the exclusion of agricultural workers from
the Labour Relations Act infringed section 2(d) in a manner that could
not be saved by section 1. That decision raised eyebrows: Did it mean
that other occupational exclusions from collective bargaining legislation,
including the professional exclusion, were now invalid? Several years
later, in its 2007 decision in BC Health Services, the SCC ruled that
section 2(d) “should be presumed to provide at least as great a level of
protection” of freedom of association as ILO Convention 87.129 Since
the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association had already declared a
decade earlier that the professional exclusion found in Ontario’s Labour
Relations Act was inconsistent with Convention 87, it appeared that the
exclusion was on life support.130

125. See David M Beatty, Putting the Charter to Work: Designing a Constitutional Labour Code
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987) at 89-90 (arguing that occupational
exclusions from collective bargaining legislation would be struck down under a Charter analysis). See
also discussion in Doorey, supra note 120 at 188-189.
126. Delisle v Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 SCR 989, 176 DLR (4th) 513.
127. See Doorey, supra note 120; Brian Langille, “The Condescending Constitution (Or, the Purpose
of Freedom of Association Is Freedom ofAssociation)” (2016) 19:2 CLELJ 335; Paul Cavalluzzo, “The
Impact of Saskatchewan Federation of Labour on Future Constitutional Challenges to Restrictions on
the Right to Strike” (2016) 19:2 CLELJ 463.
128. See Dunmore, supra note 46; Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining
Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 [BC Health Services]; Ontario (Attorney General) v Fraser,
2011 SCC 20; MPAO, supra note 10; SFL, supra note 49.
129. BC Health Services, supra note 128 at paras 70, 79.
130. “CFA Report No 308,” supra note 12 at para 187.
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Nevertheless, the Exclusionary Provinces disregarded the ILO’s CFA
and the careful language used by the SCC in the Dunmore decision left some
doubt about the constitutional status of the professional exclusion. The SCC
wrote that the exclusion of an entire occupation from collective bargaining
legislation violates section 2(d) only if it “substantially interferes” with the
exercise of constitutionally protected freedoms, including the freedom to
join with coworkers and make collective representations to an employer
without reprisals. In Dunmore, section 2(d) was infringed by the exclusion
of agricultural workers because the evidence supported a finding that
agricultural workers had been unable to associate in any meaningful way
without the statutory protections offered by the LRA.131 However, the
SCC noted also that section 2(d) would not be infringed by the exclusion
of an occupational category if the excluded workers “prove capable of
associating despite its exclusion from a protective regime.”132 It was on
this basis that the SCC distinguished its earlier decision in Delisle. The
SCC explained in Dunmore that the exclusion of the police from the Public
Sector Labour Relations Act considered in Delisle did not violate section
2(d) because the police had managed to organize into a strong association
notwithstanding the exclusion.
Even applying the narrow standard in Dunmore, a strong case can
be made that the lawyer exclusion infringes section 2(d). While some
lawyers have been able to unionize and access collective bargaining in
the Exclusionary Provinces, this success is due either to the fact their
employer is a union or “progressive” social advocacy organization and
ideologically predisposed to respecting collective bargaining rights
regardless of a statutory exclusion, or the voluntary recognition is due to
the successful threat by the union to launch a Charter challenge against the
lawyer exclusion. It would be strange indeed if the successful leveraging
of the constitutionally vulnerable professional exclusion to win voluntary,
extra-statutory collective bargaining rights were used as evidence to justify
the statutory exclusion. Overall, experience in the Exclusionary Provinces
indicates that without access to protective labour relations legislation,
there are substantial barriers facing these employees in establishing a
viable collective bargaining relationship.
However, the scope of section 2(d) has expanded significantly since
Dunmore. In its seminal 2015 decision in MPAO, the SCC overruled its
earlier decision in Delisle and decided that the exclusion of police from
the PSLRA infringed section 2(d) after all. The SCC noted that Delisle
131. Dunmore, supra note 46 at para 41.
132. Ibid at para 39.
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was decided before the recent “shift to a purposive and generous approach
to labour relations” and before the SCC had recognized a broad right
to a meaningful collective bargaining process.133 In Delisle, the SCC
considered only whether the exclusion prevented the employees from
forming or joining an association, whereas after MPAO the question is
whether the exclusion prevents employees from exercising, in practice,
a meaningful process of collective bargaining through an independent
association chosen by the employees.134 The SCC ruled in MPAO that the
purpose of the exclusion in the PSLRA was “to prevent [RCMP officers]
from engaging in collective bargaining,” which infringed section 2(d).135
The SCC also found that the alternative, employer-imposed representation
regime for RCMP members substantially interfered with freedom of
association in purpose and effect because it was not chosen or controlled by
members or independent from management. As a result of these findings,
the SCC did not find it necessary to independently determine whether the
effects of the exclusion in the PSLRA were unconstitutional.136
The infringement was not saved by section 1 because it failed both
the rational connection and the minimal impairment tests. On the minimal
impairment test, the fact that other employees in the same occupation
(police) are covered by collective bargaining legislation and bargain
collectively across the country was fatal to the government’s defence:
“Unless it is established that the RCMP is materially different from the
provincial police forces, it is clear that total exclusion from meaningful
collective bargaining cannot be minimally impairing. A material difference
has not been shown.”137 Section 2(d) did not require the government to
include the police under the PSLRA, but it did require the state to put
in place “collective bargaining processes” that ensure the employees can
exercise a meaningful process of collective bargaining.138
MPAO renewed the question of whether the professional exclusion
found in collective bargaining legislation in the four Exclusionary
Provinces infringed section 2(d). These provinces have left employed
lawyers to fend for themselves in the common law regime, without any
“collective bargaining process” at all to ensure access to a meaningful

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

MPAO, supra note 10 at para 125.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 134.
Ibid at para 136.
Ibid at para 152.
Ibid at para 137.
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process of collective bargaining including a right to strike or to access
neutral interest arbitration.139 As the SCC noted in Dunmore:
history has shown, and Canada’s legislatures have uniformly recognized,
that a posture of government restraint in the area of labour relations will
expose most workers not only to a range of unfair labour practices,
but potentially to legal liability under common law inhibitions on
combinations and restraints of trade.140

It did not take long for the labour law community to point out that the
professional exclusion was inconsistent with section 2(d) as described in
the SCC’s decision in MPAO. As noted above, in 2017, the special advisors
to the Ontario government in the Changing Workplaces Review wrote:
This prohibition directed at professionals employed in a professional
capacity is inconsistent with, and contrary to, the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of association. The Court’s purposive approach to section
2(d) was most recently summarized by Chief Justice McLachlin and
Justice LeBel in Mounted Police Association…
There is no suggestion in any of the recent jurisprudence that
professionals employed in a professional capacity should be denied the
constitutional right of freedom of association. Quite the contrary, the
broad and purposive interpretation of section 2(d) of The Constitution
Act, 1982 mandates the removal of this exclusion and extending LRA
coverage to this group of employees.141

However, once again, the Ontario government disregarded the
recommendation to remove the professional exclusion first introduced
nearly three-quarters of a century earlier.
An issue with the section 2(d) jurisprudence is that despite the
purposive approach espoused in MPAO, the SCC has not explicitly
overturned Dunmore’s positive rights framework for under-inclusion
cases.142 In the handful of post-MPAO labour board and lower court
decisions considering whether other statutory exclusions violate section
139. SFL, supra note 49. See Brian Etherington, “The Right to Strike under the Charter After
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour: Applying the New Standard to Existing Regulation of Strike
Activity” (2016) 19:2 CLELJ 429.
140. Dunmore, supra note 46 at para 20. See also Beatty, supra note 125 at 90 (noting that the
practical effect of the occupational exclusions “is to create two separate legal superstructures, which
entail radically different degrees of worker participation in the settlement of the rules that govern the
workplace…. Legally, that is discrimination of the most blatant and explicit kind”).
141. “Changing Workplaces Review,” supra note at 11 at 10.7, 139-142. See also, Lynk, supra note
120 at 15.
142. Recently, a majority of the Court suggested it remains an open question whether the heightened
substantial interference threshold outlined in Dunmore still applies to negative freedom of association
claims: see Toronto (City) v Ontario (Attorney General), 2021 SCC 34 at para 21.
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2(d), most decision-makers have continued to apply Dunmore in some
fashion. For example, in Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v
Northern Alberta Institute of Technology, the Alberta Labour Relations
Board found that the longstanding exclusion of systems analysts from
the Public Service Employee Relations Act did not violate the Charter
because, unlike in MPAO, they had not been subjected to any alternative,
deficient bargaining system.143 The Board noted that the workers were not
prohibited from associating outside the statutory regime for the purposes
of making representations to their employer on working conditions and
that there was no evidence “that such representations have been attempted,
been denied or been ineffective.”144 This decision was upheld on judicial
review.145 However, in Alberta Crown Attorneys’ Association (described
above), the Board emphasized that its earlier decision was based primarily
on the conclusion that the union lacked standing to raise the Charter
argument, that the constitutional “findings” were obiter, and that they
turned on the lack of any evidence (as required by Dunmore) of whether
the workers had attempted to organize extra-statutorily.146
In contrast, in the recent case of Illi v Legislative Assembly of British
Columbia, the BC Labour Relations Board found that the exclusion of
legislative assembly constables from the Labour Relations Code based on
parliamentary privilege violated the Charter because “it is not established
that there is another method besides the Code by which the SPCs can
access and exercise their Charter-protected right to meaningful collective
bargaining.”147 In United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta Health Services,
the applicant association successfully challenged the exclusion of nurse
practitioners from employee status under Alberta’s Labour Relations
Code.148 This amendment was enacted in 2003 after a period of inclusion.
Ultimately, neither the respondent employer nor the Attorney General
provided any defence regarding the provision’s constitutionality. The
Board accepted the uncontested evidence that at least one of the purposes
143. Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Northern Alberta Institute of Technology (2015), 262
CLRBR (2d) 38 at paras 24-26, 2015 CanLII 26017 (ABLRB) [Alberta Union]; MPAO, supra note 10
at para 136,
144. Alberta Union, supra note 143 para. 25.
145. Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Northern Alberta Institute of Technology, 2018 ABQB
236 at paras 70-73.
146. Alberta Crown Attorneys’ Association v Alberta (Justice and Solicitor General) (2019), 42
CLRBR (3d) 57 at paras 122–126, 2019 CanLII 113205 (ABLRB).
147. Illi v Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 2021 BCLRBD 176 at para 77, rev’g Legislative
Assembly of British Columbia v Legislative Assembly Protective Services Association, 2020 BCLRB
134.
148. United Nurses of Alberta v Alberta Health Services (2019), 43 CLRBR (3d) 17, 2019 CanLII
111202 (ABLRB) [cited to CLRBR].
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of the exclusion was to prevent these workers from bargaining collectively
since, among other things, UNA had been negotiating on behalf of nurse
practitioners at the time the amendment was introduced.149
In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793 v Hermanns
Contracting Limited, the applicant union successfully challenged the
exclusion of horticultural workers from the Ontario LRA.150 As is the case
with lawyers, horticultural workers are covered by collective bargaining in
many other provinces and were covered by the OLRA between 1992–1995
before the government stripped them of that coverage. The union argued
that the exclusion substantially interfered with freedom of association
by denying the workers access to any collective bargaining regime—
especially considering their general vulnerability as employees and specific
vulnerability as horticultural employees—and that the legislature had an
improper purpose in excluding them. The Attorney General argued that the
union was advancing a positive rights claim, there was no express intent to
leave horticultural employees in a vulnerable position, mere exclusion did
not violate section 2(d) since the workers were not specifically prevented
from organizing, negotiating, or withdrawing their services, and other
employees (including lawyers) were similarly excluded from the LRA.
Notably, the parties in Hermanns Contracting essentially agreed that
the Dunmore analysis applied. The OLRB adopted this framework “but as
informed by the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada”
including MPAO, adding that “[w]hether or not there has been substantial
interference with a protected freedom can only be determined in a factual
context that considers the substantive content of that freedom.”151 On the
evidence, the Board found the exclusion constituted substantial interference
because, among other things, there was no evidence of any voluntary
associational activities by the excluded employees at all. Furthermore,
the Board found it could infer that the legislature had intended to prevent
collective bargaining:
The AG’s argument in this regard is based on a flawed premise. That
premise is that the Union must be able to point to express language
on the part of the Ontario legislature that the intent of the horticultural
exclusion was to disenfranchise horticultural workers from unionization

149. Ibid at paras 51-53.
150. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 793 v Hermanns Contracting Limited
(2017), 20 CLRBR (3d) 1, 2017 CanLII 82853 (OLRB) [cited to CLRBR]. The Attorney General did
not argue that the affected workers were governed by the Agricultural Employees Protection Act with
the result that the employees were not protected by any collective bargaining legislation, similar to
lawyers and other professionals excluded from the Labour Relations Act.
151. Ibid at para 70.
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and collective bargaining. Indeed, the Union could not cite any such
language. However, what the Union could and did show was that the
Ontario Legislature excluded horticultural workers from collective
bargaining up to 1992, allowed them access for about 3 years, and then
restored the exclusion. Therefore, they are in a completely analogous
position to the agricultural workers in Dunmore supra in this regard. 152

The OLRB also rejected the need to find evidence of some special
vulnerability of horticultural workers to justify inclusion, noting that
the employee relationship is inherently vulnerable. As well, the OLRB
downplayed the fact there were a few voluntary (extra-statutory)
collective agreements that covered horticultural workers, noting that those
agreements existed because the employers wanted to compete for work on
unionized job sites.153 There was no evidence of horticultural workers being
able to unionize and bargain collective agreements in the face of employer
opposition while excluded from collective bargaining legislation.
The wholesale exclusion of horticultural workers meant that none of
the minimum requirements for a meaningful collective bargaining regime
were available to them:
…As described above, the Supreme Court of Canada has prescribed
minimum requirements for freedom of association. Those requirements
include:
•
•
•
•

The right to collectively present demands related to employment
conditions to the employer
The duty of the employer to receive the demands in good faith
The right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining
The ability of employees to advance workplace concerns free of
management’s influence

The exclusion of horticultural workers from the Act means that the Act
does not provide horticultural workers with those minimum requirements.
The horticultural employees are not covered by the Act. Nor are they
covered by the AEPA. They have no statutory protection. They are like
the title character in the 1960’s hit record by Martha and the Vandellas
because they have “nowhere to run to, nowhere to hide”. The affected
horticultural workers are in a statutory no man’s land. 154

In effect, the OLRB found the exclusion substantially interfered with
the employees’ freedom of association both in purpose and effect. The
government did not attempt to defend the exclusion under section 1.
152. Ibid at para 111.
153. Ibid at para 107.
154. Ibid at paras 128-129.
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Given the foregoing, if a fresh Charter challenge against the exclusion
of lawyers from collective bargaining legislation makes it to a tribunal
or court, the first question to be addressed will be whether the purpose
or effect of the exclusion infringes section 2(d). In Dunmore, the SCC
noted that “the exclusion of an entire category of workers from the
LRA can only be viewed as a foreseeable infringement of their Charter
rights.”155 We learned in Dunmore that a law which has as its purpose the
prevention of workers gaining access to collective bargaining infringes
section 2(d).156 As reviewed in this essay, there is not much evidence to
explain the purpose of the lawyer exclusion, because although it dates to
the late 1940s when there were hardly any employed lawyers, government
officials have rarely ever explained why it persists. We know how it got
there initially: the CBA asked for the exclusion in consultations leading to
the passage of the federal IRDIA in 1948, and the provinces then simply
adopted the exclusion when they introduced their own Wagner model
legislation modelled after the federal legislation in the period surrounding
World War II. However, this deference to the presumed majority view of
the legal profession as expressed by the CBA over 70 years ago could
hardly serve as a basis for the government’s section 1 defence today. The
majority view of the legal profession in 2021 is likely much different than
in 1948 and in any event, the Charter’s purpose obviously is not to uphold
the majority view of the ruling class within an occupation.157
There is little direct evidence from governments in the Exclusionary
Provinces that explains the purpose of the professional exclusion. I was
unable to locate any statement by a government official in Alberta, Nova
Scotia, and PEI that explains why the exclusion was initially adopted
and why it persists. The closest evidence we have to a modern statement
of purpose from an Exclusionary Province is found in the government’s
response to the complaint filed by the Canadian Labour Congress with the
ILO’s Expert Committee on Freedom of Association in 1997 arguing that
155. Dunmore, supra note 46 at para 47.
156. Ibid at para 120. See also Delisle, supra note 126 at para 89.
157. As far as I have been able to ascertain, the CBA has been silent regarding the lawyer exclusion
for the past 70 years. I reviewed CBA annual minutes of proceedings and communicated with CBA
officials requesting evidence that the national CBA has taken a position on the lawyer exclusion from
collective bargaining legislation since 1950. I have found no record of any position statement. I also
communicated with the Ontario Bar Association Director of Policy and Programming who informed
me that he was unaware of the OBA ever taking a position on the lawyer exclusion found in Ontario’s
collective bargaining legislation. The ongoing exclusion of lawyers from the LRA was not mentioned in
the OBA’s submission to the CWR: <https://www.oba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=d316aa690655-4973-bce4-a9ab13c7d05c>.” to “… OBA’s submission the CWR: “Changing Workplace Review
Consultation” (29 October 2015), online (pdf): Ontario Bar Association <www.oba.org/CMSPages/
GetFile.aspx?guid=d316aa69-0655-4973-bce4-a9ab13c7d05c> [perma.cc/2CFH-LHT5].
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the professional exclusion in Ontario violated ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
The government responded that:
labour laws originally enacted with industrial settings in mind are not
always suitable for non-industrial workplaces, such as private homes
and professional offices, where occupational duties and professional
obligations may not be compatible with the highly formalized terms and
conditions of employment and at least somewhat adversarial nature of
relationships typical of a unionized environment.158

Therefore, the government argued that employed professionals in five
of forty-six regulated professions should not have access to collective
bargaining protections because unionization and collective bargaining “may
not be” suitable for this type of worker. This claim supports the argument
that the professional exclusion is the means by which the government aims
to block or at least discourage workers employed in these five professions
from unionizing and pursuing collective agreements. That the purpose of
the professional exclusion is to block collective bargaining within the five
professions is supported as well by the decision of the Ontario government
to re-introduce the professional exclusion in 1995 and, significantly, to
legislatively strip existing collective bargaining rights covering those
professionals.159
Even if a court does not accept that preventing or discouraging
lawyers from collective bargaining is the purpose of the exclusion, there
is certainly a good strong argument that this is the effect. By exempting
the professionals from statutory unfair labour practice provisions,
certification procedures, the duty to bargain and government conciliation
services, and the provisions protecting a right to strike, the government
prevents unionization by the targeted professionals or at least preserves
the prevailing power structure of the common law model to weaken
collective bargaining to the point of ineffectiveness. Moreover, absent
statutory protections for unionization and collective bargaining activities,
employers are free to ignore unions’ recognition requests to bargain on
behalf of the excluded professionals and workers who act collectively,
including through strike activity, are vulnerable to discipline or outright
dismissal.
The SCC has warned against governmental indifference to power
structures in the employment relationship and legal models that fail to
provide adequate protections for the right of employees to join associations

158. “CFA Report No 308,” supra note 12 at para 172.
159. See LRA, supra note 96.
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and bargain collectively. In MPAO, the SCC explained the section 2(d) test
as follows:
To recap, s. 2(d) protects against substantial interference with the right
to a meaningful process of collective bargaining. Historically, workers
have associated in order “to meet on more equal terms the power
and strength of those with whom their interests interact and, perhaps,
conflict,” namely, their employers: Alberta Reference, at p. 366. The
guarantee entrenched in s. 2(d) of the Charter cannot be indifferent
to power imbalances in the labour relations context. To sanction such
indifference would be to ignore “the historical origins of the concepts
enshrined” in s. 2(d). It follows that the right to a meaningful process
of collective bargaining will not be satisfied by a legislative scheme
that strips employees of adequate protections in their interactions
with management so as to substantially interfere with their ability to
meaningfully engage in collective negotiations.160

At the same time, there may be a difference in analysis between cases
where the government has imposed an alternative, constitutionally
deficient bargaining scheme on excluded workers (as in MPAO itself),
and cases where it has simply failed to extend any statutory measures at
all. In the latter scenario, not specifically addressed in MPAO, there may
be a requirement for an analysis of state responsibility for interference in
the ability of excluded workers to associate, at least outside of the public
sector where government itself is not the employer.161 In Dunmore, for
example, the vulnerability of agricultural workers led the SCC to find that
their exclusion from the LRA functioned “not simply to permit private
interference with their fundamental freedoms, but to substantially reinforce
such interferences.”162
However, MPAO also affirmed that while a government does not need
to include all occupations under the same statutory collective bargaining
model, all workers are entitled to certain minimum constitutional
protections as part of a meaningful collective bargaining process, which
now includes a degree of employee choice and associational independence.
This suggests that, as the OLRB found in Hermanns Contracting and the
BC Board found in Illi, the complete omission of an occupation from any
collective bargaining model at all will fail to satisfy section 2(d). While
evidence of employee experience with the existing exclusionary regime
may still be required, given the SCC’s recognition of the power imbalance
160. MPAO, supra note 10 at para 80 [emphasis added].
161. See e.g. the analysis of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General),
2008 ONCA 760 at paras 102-108.
162. Dunmore, supra note 46 at para 35.
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inherent to employee-employer relationships it should no longer be
necessary to show some special vulnerability of the affected employees
to trigger a state obligation to provide (minimum) statutory protection.
Furthermore, even if employed lawyers in some of the Exclusionary
Provinces have had some limited success at organizing and bargaining
extra-statutorily by threatening Charter litigation or relying on the good
graces of their employers to agree to voluntary bargaining, this form of
contingent recognition is not at all equivalent to a statutory guarantee of
meaningful collective bargaining. To find otherwise would turn back the
2(d) clock 20 years into the past.
Assuming the professional exclusion infringes section 2(d), it is
difficult to conceive how that infringement could be saved by section 1. The
fact that thousands of lawyers across Canada have engaged in collective
bargaining for decades and that most jurisdictions in Canada already
include practicing lawyers under their collective bargaining legislation
should provide an insurmountable obstacle to any section 1 defence. As
noted earlier, the fact that police officers in other jurisdictions engage in
collective bargaining supported by statutory infrastructure was fatal to the
federal government’s section 1 argument in MPAO.163 This comparison
should apply equally to cases of complete omission from any kind of
representational or bargaining regime. The professional exclusion could
fail every step of the section 1 proportionality test, but it would certainly
fail the minimal impairment test. There is nothing unique or “materially
different” about employed lawyers in Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia,
and PEI (and Newfoundland and Labrador as pertaining to public-sector
lawyers) that would warrant excluding them from protective collective
bargaining legislation of the sort that already covers thousands of lawyers
in every other Canadian jurisdiction.
Conclusion
Several observations can be made about the situation facing lawyers
interested in collective bargaining in the four Exclusionary Provinces.
One is that without access to statutory collective bargaining machinery,
employed lawyers in the private sector have no access to meaningful
collective bargaining unless their employer agrees to an extra-statutory,
voluntary recognition. In practice, this has only occurred when the
employer is itself a union or what might be described as “a progressive
employer” interested in workers’ rights and access to justice issues (e.g.
legal clinics). Even then, the lawyer’s status as a bargaining unit employee
163. Ibid at para 152.
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is entirely contingent upon the ongoing good graces of the employer since,
legally speaking, the lawyer is not an “employee” under the collective
bargaining legislation which provides the legal foundation for the collective
bargaining relationship. Access to meaningful collective bargaining for
employed private-sector lawyers in the Exclusionary Provinces is entirely
at the pleasure of employers.
A second observation is that unions have occasionally been successful
at pressuring public sector or publicly funded organizations to voluntarily
recognize bargaining agents representing lawyers by launching Charter
challenges against the lawyer exemption or threatening to do so. In this
way, the constitutionally questionable status of the professional exclusion
hovers like an anvil over the proceedings. In some instances, as in New
Brunswick and BC, governments have conceded that the SCC’s recent
section 2(d) jurisprudence requires that statutory collective bargaining
protections be extended to lawyers. In Nova Scotia, crown attorneys have
persuaded the employer to come to the bargaining table by engaging in
recognition strikes that threaten to shut down the justice system. Given
the likelihood that the lawyer exclusion infringes section 2(d) as well
as Canada’s obligation to comply with international instruments that it
has ratified, including ILO Convention 87, it seems backwards to require
lawyers to engage in nineteenth-century style recognition strikes to obtain
access to basic statutory protections that have been available to many
lawyers and most other employees across the country for over half a
century.
A third observation is that where lawyers have managed to obtain
collective bargaining rights, the bargaining process has worked well.
Experience has demonstrated that there is nothing special about employed
lawyers that justifies treating them differently than other employees.
The only serious concern that has been raised about lawyer bargaining
pertains to the risk that essential legal work would stop in the event of
a work stoppage. However, that concern has been addressed sensibly by
the industrial relations actors themselves by recognizing the option of
binding interest arbitration and sometimes by legislation requiring interest
arbitration or essential services agreements.
Finally, the most striking aspect of the story recounted in this essay of
the persistent exclusion of practicing lawyers from collective bargaining
legislation in Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia, and PEI is that the exclusion
has never been seriously defended on policy grounds by any of these
governments. The lawyer exclusion has its roots in political deference to
the Canadian Bar Association of a bygone era when the legal profession
was comprised of men working as sole practitioners far above the fray of
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working-class trade unionism. That the exclusion has survived for nearly
75 years despite a fundamental transformation of the legal profession, a
profound change in attitudes towards professional collective bargaining,
and the entrenchment of a broad constitutional right to collective bargaining
and to strike, is a testament to history’s stubborn and irrational grip on the
present.

